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On October 22, 1996, John Paul II addressed the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences on the origin of life and evolution. He argued that the results of fifty
years of investigative studies in various branches of science have moved the
Church's receptivity to the theory of evolution beyond its tentative response in
Humani Generis (1950).1 The fact that a half century of scientific research
independently conducted in varying fields has unanimously corroborated the
theory is, in the Pope's opinion, "a significant argument'" in its favor.
John Paul also issued an important proviso that, unfortunately, was not
included in much of the media coverage of his statement. He insisted that,
although the assemble.d research "leads to the recognition of more than a
hypothesis in the theory of evolution,"2 not every interpretation of the theory is
compatible with the truth of Divine Revelation about the identity of the human
person. The methodology that is employed to articulate the evolutionary theory
cannot "totally prescind from Revelation with regard to the question it raises."3
In fact, since many of the current methodologies behind evolutionary science
neglect the question of the 'non-material origin ofthe soul, the Pope argues that it
is legitimate to speak of theories of evolution. Three examples are mentioned: a
reductionist, a materialist and a spiritualist theory.4 Of the three, only the latter is
compatible with revealed truth.
Toward the end of evaluating these various theories of evolution in a faith
context, this essay will, first, define the Simple Simon Syndrome, second, outline
salient features of the Pope's conception of a spiritualist theory of evolution, and,
third, evaluate the soundness of a theory of evolution based on a reductionist
philosophy.
I. The Simple Simon Syndrome?

You remember Simple Simon. His follies were recounted in one of those
childhood nursery rhymes we recited as children. He was the fellow that never
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seemed to employ a proper means to his intended goals. He wanted to buy some
pies but lacked the money to do so. He wanted to feast on wild duck but wasn't a
skillful enough marksman to shoot the bird either before or after it took flight. But
perhaps his silliest faux pas was when "he went fishin' for to catch a whale, and
all the water he had got was in his mother's pail." British physiologist Sir Francis
Walshe was probably the first to diagnose the Simple Simon Syndrome in
reference to the reductionist philosophy that drives much of the methodology,
interpretations, and applications of contemporary evolutionary theory.
We all know the nursery tale of Simple Simon who went fishing for whales in his
mother's pail. I am happy not to find myself in the ranks of those scientific Simple
Simons who believe that with better hooks, lines, baits, pitched into the same pail, they •
will fish out from it the answer to the riddle of the soul and the mind. The whale isn't in
the pail!
We live in at least two worlds, the world of the humanities and the world of science.
The former cannot be reduced to the latter. 5

Walshe's insights echo those of Pius XII's teaching in Humani Generis and John
Paul II's advice in his Oct. 22nd address. All of these judgments provide a sound
criterion to help us assess the legitimacy ofthe reductionist and materialist-driven
theories of evolution which abound today. For our purposes, the standard used to
scrutinize a reductionist theory Df evolution will be integrated under the one rule,
'Evolutionary theories ought to avoid the Simple Simon Syndrome.'
II. A Spiritualist Theory of Evolution: Compatible with Revealed Faith

Isn't a spiritualist theory of evolution an oxymoron? John Paul II doesn't
necessarily think so. He argues that contradictions that arise prima facie may
prove, ~fter closer scrutiny, to be only apparent conflicts. 6 Ultimately, a
spiritualist view of evolution must demonstrate that the physical continuity
which is typically the focus of evolutionary research need not be in opposition to
the ontological discontinuity associated with the first appearance of the human
person. If empirical scientists are true to the strengths and limitations of their
particular areas of expertise, they will realize that, while the "moment of
transition to the spiritual" cannot be empirically proven, science can "discover at
the experimental level a series of very valuable signs indicating what is specific to
the human being" (emphasis mine).7 At that point, those involved in
experimental sciences must entrust their research to the discipline of philosophy
which is competent to explain what the ontological leap means in terms of
spiritual behavior. Philosophy can interpret the meaning of man's natural
capacities and activities that include metaphysical knowledge, self-awareness,
self-reflection, moral conscience, freedom, and aesthetic and religious
experience.
But the interdisciplinary nature of an adequate evolutionary science doesn't
stop there. Scientists and philosophers must then submit their findings to
theologians whose expertise it is to demonstrate the ultimate meaning of the
unique capacities of the human being. The proper provenance of theology is to
reflect on the meaning of the embodied spirit of the human being as it is made in
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God's image, divinized by Christ's salvific acts, and destined for eternal life in
God. For this reason, the Pope insists that the Church's openness to an
evolutionary theory turns on, first, whether the hypothesis recognizes what
Scripture tells us about the temporal and eternal destiny of the body-soul totality
of the human being. Second, ecclesial receptivity depends on efforts to reconcile
this revealed truth with scientific data. 8
It follows, therefore, that the litmus test for the adequacy of various
philosophies that drive the methodologies used to argue evolution is that they
must exhibit a weltanshauung that is compatible with revelaed truth about the
human person. A critical point is this. A theory of evolution that is in harmony
with Christian Revelation must acknowledge that the mind or non-material
nature of the human being cannot emerge from "the forces of living matter" nor
come to be as "mere epiphenomenon of living matter."9 John Paul ratifies the
point made by Pius XlI in Human Generis. While the evolution of preexistent
matter may explain the origin of the human body, it cannot account for the
presence of the human soul and its spiritual powers, nor can it ground human
dignity. Since spiritual powers and functions always presuppose a spiritual
source, the spiritual powers of man's intellect and will could not have evolved
from non-human or brute animals. Matter is the antithesis of spirit in the sense
that there is no potency in matter for the spiritual. The Pope implies, therefore,
that a scientist who is a proponent of an evolutionary theory compatible with
revealed faith will admit that there are things about the human species that he is
unable to prove empirically. When reflecting on the first primates who appeared
in the evolutionary timelinc-and who were capable of intellectual activities
peculair to the human species, the scientist needs to be open to the reality that the
capacity for those activities originates only indirectly in the material body
disposed to that kind of activity through an evolutionary process. Specific human
behavior follows .most directly from the spiritual principle or form of that body,
an intellectual soul immediately created by God. Since there is no potency in
matter for the spiritual, a being could not carry out intellectual pursuits, be
creative, or freely make choices without an intellectual soul-even if his body
had developed to a proportionately complex stage.
ID. A Reductionist Theory of Evolution

By reducing higher beings and their functions to lower beings and their
functions, a reductionist theory of evolution is an attempt to demonstrate how
one type of organism evolved into or became another organism. In this view, the
essential differences between living and nonliving beings and between the various
species ofliving beings are quantitative not qualitative, accidental not essential. In
the case under scrutiny, the substantial differences between humans and animals
can be explained in terms of differences in degree, not kind. Essential differences
between species are not substantial changes but accidental ones. Take any human
capacity or function whether physiological or physical and, according to a
reductionist perspective, the only difference in the way that it is present in animals
as opposed to humans is that human beings possess more of the given quality or
80

Linacre Quarterly

function, animals less of it. Accordingly, a human being's intellectual learning
represents a higher expression of an animal's conditioned reflex activities. And an
animal's conditioned reflex activities are a higher manifestation of a plant's
stimulus-response pattern or tropism. The dissimilarities of capacities and
functions of different species are accidental ones based as they are on more or less
(quantity). Consequently, all lines of demarcation on the continuum of living
species are blurred. As Carl Sagan illustrates in his statement that there are "no
important differences between apes and man,"10 a reductionist evolutionary
science minimalizes or denies species or categorizations according to essential
differences.
A contemporary reductionist theory of evolution has its most immediate roots
in 19th century thought. Carl Sagan's remark is merely a take-off of a century's
old idea expressed by Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895): "No absolute structural
line of demarcation ... can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves;
and I may add ... that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally
futile,and that even the highest faculties of feeling and intellect begin to germinate
in lower forms of life." II In this perspective, all living beings are reduced to the
same cellular or chemical substrate. The same kind of reasoning is what
prompted 1937 Nobel Prize winner Albert Szent-Gryoraji to argue that because
of "the great, fundamental unity of living nature," there is "no real difference
between cabbages and kings, we are all recent leaves on the old tree of life."12
An article entitled "What Does It Mean To Be One of Us?" in the November,
1996, issue of the Life magazine combines a commentary by Kenneth Miller with
the intriguing photographs of Lennart Nilsson.I3 The Nilsson photos, "an
interspecies family album," provide a comparative study of the exqusite
choreography of parental development amongst human and non-human
preborns. My critique will focus on Miller's narrative because in it he constructs
the philosophical-scientific window through which he invites the reader to view
the photos.
In his verbal assessment of Nilsson's photos, Miller talks very much like a
reductionist. He argues that, in attempts to uncover "our identity as Homo
sapiens,"14 rather than concentrating on differences between man and lower
species, we ought first to understand how humans are like other animals. Only
when we see our resemblances to other species will the differences between us
become obvious.
Miller rightly contends that Nilsson's photographs make believers out of
laymen faster than would any pedantic biological lecture on the drama of
evolutionary science. These pictures are worth much more than a thousand
words. They demonstrate almost at a glance the kinship which humans and
nonhumans share. The photos confirm that, from a comparative anatomy view,
we're all one bjg family. Then Miller explains that the similarities ofthe prenatal
developmental schema amongst various species of vertebrates points to their
shared ancestry. Whether it's the prenatal development of a pig, chick, monkey
or human being, Nilsson's photos help us to see how "nature is retracing an
eons-old learning curve"15 in the successive stages of their embryonic and fetal
development. All stages of vertebrate prenatal development from the multicelled
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sphere, the tubular body, the segmented body with notochord, etc., mirrors the
genetic-directed choreography of the evolutionary process. 700 million years
ago, the multicellar organism evolved into a tubular marine creature. Tubular
marine animals evolved into animals with segmented bodies and a flexible spinal
chord or notochord. 500 million years ago, animals with segmented bodies
evolved into the first vertebrates, primitive fish. From mutant fish we got
amphibians, amphibians begat reptiles, reptiles begat mammals. Primates arose
from mammals and the direct ancestors of human beings arose from primates.
Up to this point, we cannot say that there is an intrinsic incompatibility
between Miller's account of the evolutionary history of our bodies and the
question of the origin of the human soul. He appears to respect the limits of
empirical science. However, when Miller returns to the subject of the uniqueness
of the human being, the inadequacy of a reductionist view rears its head.
"Science," he admits, "has been nibbling away at our sense of uniqueness."
Researchers in the wild can give ample examples of very human-like behavior
amongst subhuman beings such as monkeys and elephants. Besides learning
some sign language, chimpanzees (who, he claims, share 99.9% of human genes)
"invent simple tools, use herbal medicines, jockey for political advantage and
teach etiquette to their young."16 Elephants, on the other hand, have been seen to
"observe a moment of silence near the skeletons of fallen herdmates and carry off
bits of bone as mementos."17 Abandoned young birds don't sing "more than a
few faltering notes" indicating that this activity is learned from its elders rather
than being a behavior arising solely from instinct. 18
Miller's examples from the wild raise some questions. That researchers
actually witnessed the animal behavior just described is not incredible. But what
is not convincing is the interpretation he places on them. Take the elephant's
actions, for example. Is there any way of knowing empirically that the exhibited
behavior among the herdmates is a lesser (or equal?) degree of the same kind of
respect among humans? But that he does opt for these interpretations provides a
clue as to Miller's hidden or not-so-hidden agenda. From these examples, he
concludes that human beings aren't so different from other animals after all. Even
the intellectual or spiritual activities traditionally ascribed only to humans exist at
some startingly high degree in subhuman species. Therefore, dissimilarities
between humans and other vertebrates are "more a matter of degree than of
kind."19 Even in man's intellectual achievements, he advises, we ought to
recognize our closeness to "the less accomplished animals." In other words, man
may be much smarter than the chimpanzee, but that must be due to the small
percentage of genetic differences between the two primates not to any essential
difference involving an intellectual soul. Since the needs for the types of activity
that make the human being outstanding in his functional abilities are from lower
species, we ought to respect all life. All life is sacred, Miller, argues, because
(quoting Nilsson approvingly) "we are all the same thing."20
With these conclusions, Miller's commentary illustrates the principal flaws in a
reductionist theory of evolution. First, it effaces the commonsense notion that
living things are represented by a hierarchy of beings - plants, animals, humans
- each of which exemplify substantial or essential differences from the rest.
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Second, if the differences between man and the other species of vertebrates is a
matter of more and less, positing an intellectual soul for the human species is an
unnecessary assumption in ascertaining the meaning of life. But without at least
the recognition of the spiritual nature of the human being, a reductionist theory of
evolution cannot render a total view of what it means to be human; it reduces the
human being to matter only. Third, a reductionist science obfuscates or neglects
altogether the recognition that the origin of man's soul lies outside of the
parameters of scientific expertise. It insists on finding the whale in the pail. In
short, a reductionist view of evolution suffers from the Simple Simon Syndrome.
Accordingly, behavior such as thinking and willing does not arise from the
substantial form or human soul of the person but from a material-based
complexity. Genes or genetic mutations specific to Homo sapiens are the sole
source of the level of the intellectual and volitional activities traditionally
attributed to the human being. That's why reductionists claim that chimpanzees
. reason but just not as well as human beings. Finally, as we will discuss below, if
practice should follow from theory, a reductionist view of evolution has the
potential to lead to ethical practices that could only be described as barbaric. The
difference between identifying the human being as a glorified animal rather than
as a person is the difference between a moral order based on human dignity and a
society lacking a moral anchor altogether.
IV. A Critique of Reductionism: Behavior That Makes Human Beings
Unique
Based on the principle that the activities proper to a being follow from its
essence, the most direct way to critique Miller's reductionist view of evolution is,
first, to identify from a commonsense view what kind of activities appear to be
unique to humans. 21 The fallacy of a reductionist view of evolution that claims
that human intellectual behavior is a more complex example of animal rational
activity shows up immediately in the following capacities that are distinctly
human. As the analysis will make clear, these activities are not a matter of a
human ability differing from a corresponding animal by dint of degree, as Miller
and other reductionists argue. Animals simply lack the capacities for these
activities altogether. Second, when we inquire as to the source of such
metaphysical activities, we must look for a proportionate wellspring. Spiritual
activities, like the ones described below, manifest a spiritual nature. They are the
particular functions of a human being's intellect and will which inhere in the
spiritual principle of the soul.
1) Only human beings engage in symbolic communication.
Language is a sign that represents thought. But it is a construed sign not a
natural one such as smoke or fire. Language is a symbol arbitrarily assigned
which leads the mind to the knowledge of something else, namely, the reality
behind the symbol. Therefore, we can conclude that
the intellect is able to transcend the physical limits of matter by arbitrarily bestowing
upon a thing a conventional term which in no way is necessarily related to the thing
signified. That is, there is no intrinsic necessity that such a natural thing as a flower be
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given the name "rose." . .. Since the human intellect, in thus transcending the conditions
of matter, communicates in a suprasentient way, it must itself be a suprasentient or
spiritual power (for a things acts according to its nature).22

Communication between animals is very much confined to the concrete and
the immediate. Therefore, although animals produce sounds, they do not
communicate in a meaningful way. They lack an intelligence capable of
abstraction and cannot, as a result, recognize what an arbitrarily assigned symbol
represents. Similarly, idiomatic expressions like "It's six of one and a half dozen
of another" would stump any creature lacking a suprasentient intellect. For the
same reason, animals would not understand or create synonyms or homonyms,
equivocation, riddles, or conundrums. If we took a chimpanzee for a Sunday
drive, we could not depend on it to help us decipher the clever personalized
license plates that are evidence of our ability to play with the language. Animals
have left no records of inventing symbols; humans demonstrate a proliferation of
symbols as chemistry and mathematics demonstrate.
Perhaps the most definitive indicator of differences between animal and
human communication is this: only human beings develop languages. Of the over
8,000 extant languages, each requires intellectual skills on the part of the speaker
to master its grammar. But there is no such intellectual creativity in the realm of
animal talk. A bark of a dog is the same today as it was eons ago; a Persian cat in
France will have the same basic meow as its American counterpart; chimps
which have been trained to say a few words cannot master the demands of
grammar and syntax required by every human language.
Finally, there are those who emphasize that animals do understand things
when people speak to them. Well that may be true, but not in the human sense of
understanding. Human knowledge includes self-consciousness as well as
consciousness. A rat may know that it is wet, but it does not know that it knows it.
I know that I am wet from walking in the rain, and I know that I know it.
2. Only human beings are scientific.
Any quantitative differences in the ability to master science lies within the
human species. It's not as if a chimpanzee is a better botanist than a grasshopper.
But Einstein was definitely a better scientist than my high school physics teacher.
As genetic engineering and the human genome project prove, the human species
is even capable ofmanipulating its heredity and directing its evolution. This is all
possible because, first, human beings have what animals lack: intellects that are
capable of abstracting universals from particulars. All science deals with the
universal component of things. For example, every molecule of alcohol is C H
OH. Second, only human beings are able to grasp causality. Animals are not
scientists or philosophers because they are not capable of grasping the intellectual
concept of cause and effect which is essential to all scientific and philosophical
knowledge. In short, animals are riot capable of ideas. Whitehead said it well:
"Science and philosophy belong to men alone."23
3. Only human beings create works of art.
It has been said that art is the signature of man. G.K. Chesterton quipped that,
although archeological digs have turned up pictures of reindeer drawn by
prehistoric man, no digs will ever uncover a picture of man drawn by a
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prehistoric reindeer! When you think about it, since much of primitive art is
linked to symbolism, it should not come as a surprise that it is exclusive to man.
Sir Julian Huxley opines that "One ofthe greatest mysteries of human evolution
is the sudden outburst of art of a very high quality in the upper Paleolithic
period."24 Furthermore, no animal species can boast of a Mozart, a
Michelangelo, or a Shakespeare.
4. Only human beings are religious.
Durkheim's encyclopedic study, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
shows that, as long as there have been humans around, they have been believers.
Anthropologists confirm that every society exhibits a religious tendency. Again,
it is not a matter of anthropoids being less religious than humans. There is no
evidence that anthropoids are religious at all, nor interested in worshiping a deity
whom they may desire to appease, praise, or thank. Degrees of religiosity exist
only between members of the human species. William James declared that
religion is a phenomenon exclusive to the human being, something "we meet
nowhere else."25
5. Only human beings make tools and complex machines.
So as not to get embroiled in a discussion about whether an animal's use of a
twig is tantamount to being a tool-maker, one should begin by defining a tool as
an artificial object. And the reason why some have suggested that homo faber is
the most definitive way to describe man is that only man both fashions tools and
makes tools out of other tools. Further, only man using many tools constructs
complex machines. A hammer, drill, screwdriver, snowblower, windmill, and
spacecraft all bear human signature. No evidence exists for comparable artifacts
designed by animals.
6. Only human beings have a history.
When an historian records history, he doesn't record everything that happens
within a given block of time, but he does use a meta-historical principle in his
process of selectivity that reflects what he believes is important or is of value.
Such attention to the moral aspect of events indicates that writing history is a
specifically human endeavor because it presupposes a spiritual nature capable of
metaphysical and moral reflection. As Azar reasons, "Why is it that, of all beings,
only man has a history; why is it that no other animal is aware of its past?
Inasmuch as he has a body ... , man is temporal; and without time, there would
be no history .. . Further, because man has a spiritual intellect, he can use matter
as a means in his development, this progress constituting his history."26 Having a
history also implies that man has a future, that he is basically a being in process
whose development will itself become his history. Unlike inanimate things which
are complete or finished from the start, development in humans is always
incomplete and, therefore, capable of becoming more perfect. For theologians
like Augustine, Whitehead, or Teilhard de Chardin, history is evidence that time
and temporal activities are both guided by God and tending toward God.
7. Only human beings are free persons.
Only a human being is created for his own sake. That is why every person with
even a minimally developed moral sense recoils from being used solely for
someone else's pleasure or welfare. Each human being is an end in itself and
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should never be used as a mere means to another end. As free agents, human
beings are most themselves when in freedom they choose among goods presented
by the intellect or choose not to choose at all. Only human beings choose a spouse
from among many candidates and then choose to commit themselves for life to
this other person, to love and to cherish him until death. Only human beings
choose one profession among many and serve family and society by functioning
in that profession. While animals are driven to copulate when in heat, only
humans are capable of choosing whether to engage in or abstain from sexual
relations. Only the human being is free to act morally by choosing life, loving
God and others, forming friendships, entering into communion with others,
working for a society based on moral values.
While animals have certain inclinations or instinctual drives which
automatically bring them to their fulfillment, in the human being, by contrast,
there are no such pre-programmed guides for perfection. Man must find personal
integration and fulfillment by choosing to act so as to regulate the basic human
inclinations which frequently war against one another.
Animals eat, sleep, defend themselves, and reproduce not because they choose
to but because they are responding to instinctual drives. They act instinctually;
they do not exercise freedom of choice and, therefore, are not held morally
responsible for their actions. Correspondingly, if animals kill their own young,
they are not brought to trial for murder. Human beings, on the other hand, with
their capability of recognizing good and evil, are held accountable for what they
choose.
Given the rational or spiritual nature of the specific capabilities of the human
being we have just described, we must conclude that the only proportionate
source for self-awareness, reason, freedom, and imagination is a rational or
spiritual soul, unique to the human species. The human being, while very much a
part of nature, transcends the rest of nature by virtue of his definitive peculiarity.
Only man is an embodied spirit or an inspirited body.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most telling commentary against a reductionist view of evolution
is that, in denying the spiritual nature of man and rejecting the spiritual faculties
of the intellect and the will, it disavows human freedom. But in this case, if
practice follows theory, a reductionist view of evolution has some devastating
consequences for ethics. If the human person is not free, he is also not a moral
being, not accountable for the good and evil he realizes in his actions. If the
human being is unidimensional, that is, matter only, if there are no substantial
differences between us and animals and the rest of nature, if what gives the
human being an edge over other primates is linked to genetically-driven
superiority producing a bigger brain and better larynxes rather than being a
thinking, free person, what grounds the dignity of such a glorified animal? And if
human beings do not possess a dignity specific to them arising from their spiritual
nature, is it fair to rate present day genocide or that of Adolf Hitler as an atrocity?
If animals can be slaughtered with impunity, why condemn the slaughter of
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humans? Why not condone cannibalism?
If we reduce man to biology and strip him of his free will, why should we
dedicate hospitals and clinics for the care of the sick and the aged? Why should
we bother to be truthful in our dealing with others, why should we be respectful
of others, their lives, goods, wives? Why should we honor and obey our parents,
or respect our spouses or children or siblings? If man is determined and not free to
choose, why would we even need a moral code like the 10 Commandments?
If man is not, by nature, able to know the truth and love the good, ifhe is only a
material being that has struck it lucky with a developmental history marked by
chance and necessity, devoid of teleology, then why shouldn't we declare God
dead, a human projection, a vestige of a primitive mind which was woefully
ignorant of what evolutionary theory now teaches us about ourselves? If God is
dead, what's to anchor a democracy founded on the notion of "one nation under
God with liberty and justice for all?" If God is dead and the divine and natural
law defunct, then why shouldn't we be able to justify just about every sort of evil
deed?
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